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“Unbridled confidence and arrogance are characteristics of successful business visionaries.” 





Previous research has mainly investigated the effect of CEO overconfidence on financial outcomes. 
However, only little research has been conducted about the influence of CEO overconfidence on 
firm innovation. Moreover, no studies have examined when CEO background characteristics such 
as tenure and power distance, influence the latter relationship. Consequently, the purpose of this 
master’s thesis is to analyze the impact of CEO overconfidence on firm innovation, and to explore 
whether tenure and power distance influence this relationship.  
Using shareholder letters to measure overconfidence, the results indicate that over the 2008-2016 
period, CEO overconfidence positively influences firm innovation for well established-
multinationals active in non-innovative industries. Nonetheless, for well-established multinationals 
in innovative industries, there exists no relationship between CEO overconfidence and innovation. 
Furthermore, in line with the theoretical research, the findings demonstrate a negative moderating 
impact of tenure in both innovative and non-innovative industries. Unlike CEO tenure, the 
influence of CEO power distance could not be investigated due to correlational issues with both 
CEO overconfidence and CEO tenure. 
By highlighting the importance of CEO overconfidence in explaining a valuable organizational 
outcome such as firm innovation and by unveiling the moderating impact of CEO tenure, the thesis 
contributes to the existing upper-echelons and tone-at-the-top literature. 
Keywords: CEO overconfidence, firm innovation, CEO tenure, CEO power distance, 
multinationals, industry innovativeness, upper-echelon theory, tone at the top  
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Apple is generally considered one of the world’s most innovative companies. For eleven 
consecutive years, Apple remains at the top of Boston Consulting Group (BCG) Global Innovation 
List (Chandran, 2017). Moreover, during the last decade they successfully introduced several 
disruptive inventions such as iTunes, the iPod, the iPhone, and the iPad. Nonetheless, the Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO), Steve Jobs, who was responsible for this success, has always been 
considered a prime example of an overconfident CEO. Jobs always trusted his own revolutionary 
vision and was known for not being receptive to feedback and focus groups (Adams, 2012). 
In line with this example, the purpose of this thesis is to investigate the effect of CEO 
overconfidence on a firm’s innovation performance. Overconfidence is defined as the phenomenon 
whereby an individual’s certainty about his/her predictions (Busenitz & Barney, 1994), abilities 
(Galasso & Simcoe, 2011; Gervais & Odean, 2001; Hirshleifer, Low, & Teoh, 2012a), and 
knowledge (Friedman, 2007) exceeds the accuracy of these (Klayman, Soll, González-Vallejo, & 
Barlas, 1999). Moreover, overconfidence is in conflict with standard economic models (Galasso & 
Simcoe, 2011) and rational decision making. Nonetheless, a large part of the literature divulges 
that most individuals are systematically overconfident about their abilities and ‘beliefs’ (Gervais 
& Odean, 2001). Exemplary, Deery (1999) indicates how young drivers tend to overestimate their 
own driving abilities compared to more experienced drivers. Additionally, when looking at it on 
an organizational level overconfidence appears to be omnipresent, as demonstrated in the ‘Steve 
Jobs’ example. Therefore, there exists a growing interest on the effect that CEO overconfidence 
has on several organizational outcomes. 
Previous research mainly looked into the effect of CEO overconfidence on financial outcomes such 
as dividend policy (Deshmukh, Goel, & Howe, 2013), merger and acquisition activity (Brown & 
2 
 
Sarma, 2007; Ferris, Jayaraman, & Sabherwal, 2013; Malmendier & Tate, 2008), corporate 
investment (Malmendier & Tate, 2005), trading performance (Barber & Odean, 2001), and 
earnings management (Hribar & Yang, 2010; Schrand & Zechman, 2012). However, the effect of 
CEO overconfidence on innovation has received less attention. Nonetheless, in the current era of 
globalization, internationalization, and technological revolution, a corporate culture that fosters 
innovation has become crucial (Knight & Cavusgil, 2004; Tellis, Prabhu, & Chandy, 2009).  
Previous research by Galasso and Simcoe (2011), Hirshleifer et al. (2012a), and Engelen, 
Neumann, and Schwens (2015) already demonstrated the existence of a positive relationship 
between both constructs. However, these studies measured overconfidence based on the ‘in-the-
money stock options’ methodology by Malmendier and Tate (2005) or on how CEOs are portrayed 
in the news media. However, no prior research has used shareholder letters to explore the 
relationship between CEO overconfidence and innovation. Secondly, previous research also did 
not examine how a CEO’s background affects this relationship. Nonetheless, the attitude that an 
overconfident CEO has towards innovation may be modified by several background variables, such 
as tenure in the CEO position (Musteen, Barker III, & Baeten, 2010) and cultural values 
(Geletkanycz, 1997; Jalbert, Chan, Jalbert, & Landry, 2007). CEOs tend to grow stale in the saddle 
(Miller, 1991) and establish fixed routines as their tenure increases (Musteen et al., 2010), 
producing a modifying influence on the relationship between CEO overconfidence and firm 
innovation. Furthermore, cultural values, such as the distribution of power between a CEO and his 
organizational members (Morrison & Milliken, 2000; Shane, 1993), influence a CEO’s attitude 
towards change and innovation. Consequently, this thesis will also explore the moderating effect 
of CEO background variables – proxied by CEO tenure and CEO power distance – on the 
relationship between CEO overconfidence and innovation. And finally, the research by Galasso 
3 
 
and Simcoe (2011) and Hirshleifer et al. (2012a) empirically validated their hypotheses on data 
from before 2005. Hence, it is value-adding to reconfirm the relationship between CEO 
overconfidence and innovation, when considering that the financial crisis in 2008 affected the 
perception and acceptance about overconfidence, 
Thus, this thesis aspires to cover current gaps in the literature by employing an uncommon tool, 
namely shareholder letters, to measure CEO overconfidence. Based on the importance of leadership 
as a language-based phenomenon, such a meaning-oriented method could be better suited when 
determining CEO overconfidence (Amernic, Craig, & Tourish, 2010; Pondy, McCall, & 
Lombardo, 1989). Moreover, by considering the moderating effect of a CEO’s background – 
proxied by CEO tenure and CEO power distance, this research provides new insights about when 
CEO overconfidence impacts innovation. And lastly, by examining the period of 2008-2016, this 
thesis takes a present-day view on the subject. This is done in contrast to previous studies by 
Galasso and Simcoe (2011) and Hirshleifer et al. (2012a), who looked into the time periods 1980-
1994 and 1993-2003, respectively. 
To gain an understanding about the effect of CEO overconfidence on innovation, the remainder of 
this thesis proceeds as follows. Firstly, section 2 introduces the theoretical concepts of 
overconfidence and innovation, elaborates how CEO overconfidence impacts innovation and 
explores the impact of a CEO’s background on the latter relationship. Next, section 3 outlines the 
research design that is employed during the thesis. Subsequently, section 4 summarizes the results 
and examines whether the results support the anticipated hypotheses. And finally, section 5 
discusses the results and concludes this master’s thesis. 
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2. Theoretical background 
To lay the conceptual foundation for the thesis, this section firstly clarifies the overarching theory, 
namely upper echelons theory (UET). Subsequently, an introduction is given to the constructs of 
‘overconfidence’ and ‘firm innovation’. And lastly, this section develops the hypotheses that will 
be investigated throughout the thesis, being, the impact of CEO overconfidence on firm innovation, 
and how CEO background might moderate the latter relationship. 
2.1 Upper Echelons Theory   
The broader research domain in which this thesis is situated, is the Upper Echelons Theory (UET).  
UET argues that organizational outcomes are reflections of the cognitive biases and managerial 
beliefs of powerful actors within an organization. This is based on the idea that upper echelons 
inevitably manage an organization based on their personal values, beliefs, and characteristics. 
Accordingly, based on top executives’ psychological characteristics it becomes possible to partially 
predict organizational outcomes (Hambrick & Mason, 1984) and culture (Berson, Oreg, & Dvir, 
2008). In line with this outlook, the thesis explores whether an association exists between the 
cognitive bias ‘overconfidence’ and ‘firm innovation’.  
In general, UET employs observable characteristics (for instance age, functional tracks, 
experiences or education) to proxy managerial beliefs and biases of the top management team 
(TMT). Nonetheless, this thesis directly measures overconfidence by employing shareholder letters 
and linguistic software. Moreover, instead of looking at the entire top management team (TMT) to 
predict an organizational outcome, this thesis focusses on the CEO. Because the CEO is the most 
influential and powerful member within the TMT, this executive will also have the most 





‘Overconfidence’ or the act of being exceedingly ‘self-assured’, is commonly defined as the 
appearance of extreme self-certainty about an individual’s predictions, while this is not in line with 
the accuracy of these (Hirshleifer et al., 2012a; Klayman et al., 1999; Simon & Houghton, 2003). 
However, overconfidence is not just limited to predictions. Overconfidence also handles about an 
unjustifiable degree of confidence about an individual’s abilities (Friedman, 2007; Galasso & 
Simcoe, 2011; Grinblatt & Keloharju, 2009) and knowledge (Hayward, Shepherd, & Griffin, 
2006). Nonetheless, it is also important to highlight how overconfidence differs from extreme 
certainty. Whenever an individual is extremely confident in his beliefs, but is faultless, this is not 
considered overconfident (Simon & Houghton, 2003). Moreover, overconfident decision-makers 
are depicted as persons who are excessively optimistic during their initial assessment (Busenitz & 
Barney, 1994), avoid negative feedback (Ehrlinger, Mitchum, & Dweck, 2016), only slowly 
incorporate additional information (Busenitz & Barney, 1994), and overestimate the value created 
by undertaking a particular project (Malmendier & Tate, 2015; Wong, Lee, & Chang, 2017). 
In addition, the psychology literature categorizes overconfidence as a cognitive or behavioral bias 
(Busenitz & Barney, 1994; Friedman, 2007; Staw, 1991). Such a cognitive bias influences the 
decision rules, opinions, and cognitive mechanisms during an individual’s decision-making 
process. Consequently, as argued by the upper-echelons perspective, top management’s cognitive 
biases shape organizational outcomes (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). Besides, Haley and Stumpf 
(1989) and Busenitz and Barney (1994) also recognize how cognitive biases, such as 
overconfidence, are vital in explaining differences in executives’ strategic decisions. 
When looking into the leading causes of overconfidence, Russo and Schoemaker (1992) 
acknowledge mainly two of them. Firstly, Russo and Schoemaker (1992) state how availability and 
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hindsight are important in explaining overconfidence. These principles stipulate how overconfident 
executives have difficulties in imagining all possible ways in which a project can unfold. Hence, 
overconfident individuals tend to present a project more predictable than it is. By doing so, they 
often oversee the possibility of non-success or even failure (Camerer & Lovallo, 1999). And 
secondly, Russo and Schoemaker (1992) also disclose how anchoring and confirmation biases 
foster overconfidence. These concepts indicate that overconfident executives anchor on one 
particular idea and additionally seek confirmation for this initial idea. Besides, other research by 
Ehrlinger et al. (2016) also focusses on the confirmation bias as an important trigger for 
overconfidence. 
Throughout all studies that have been measuring executive overconfidence, extant methods were 
employed (Bollaert & Petit, 2010). Psychometric personality tests (Graham, Harvey, & Puri, 2013), 
in-the-money stock options (Malmendier & Tate, 2005, 2008), media coverage (Hirshleifer et al., 
2012a), shareholder letters (Brennan & Conroy, 2013), and relative compensation (Hayward & 
Hambrick, 1997) are all examples of possible overconfidence measures. However, Hill, Kern, and 
White (2014) argue that some of these measures score low on content validity. Hence, some 
overconfidence measures do not adequately review for executive overconfidence. Nonetheless, 
shareholder letters achieve a good score for content validity. The strength of this approach is that 
it reflects the mindset of top executives (Rovenpor, 1993) while accounting for leadership as a 
language-based phenomenon (Fairhurst, 2008; Pondy et al., 1989). Besides, Malmendier and Tate 
(2015) also indicate the potential shareholder letters have in reflecting overconfidence because of 
the improving capabilities of text analysis software. In the research design section, this thesis will 




2.3 Firm innovation 
This thesis examines how CEO overconfidence, as defined in the previous section, impacts firm 
innovation. Accordingly, it is essential to briefly unfold why the research examines the particular 
organizational outcome of firm innovation. 
Drucker (1998) describes innovation as the effort to create purposeful, focused change in an 
enterprise’s economic or social potential. Moreover, Drucker (2014) also argues that because of 
increasing globalization, fast-changing markets, sustainability issues, and the emergence of digital 
technologies, innovation has never been as important as today in creating a competitive advantage. 
However, for many companies, the innovation process is a risky one as it is characterized by many 
complex, uncertain, but high-impact decisions. In other words, Miles, Snow, Meyer, and Coleman 
(1978) describe organizations that permanently pursue an innovative corporate culture as 
‘prospectors’. These prospectors focus on exploring new opportunities and on preserving close 
alignment with the external environment. Furthermore, there exist several types of innovation, 
ranging from radical to incremental ones. Papadakis and Bourantas (1998) divide innovation into 
four groups – namely the introduction of new products, the significant innovation in existing 
products, the incremental innovation in existing products, and the innovation in process 
technology.  
2.4 The influence of CEO overconfidence on firm innovation 
Firstly, several studies argue that overconfident CEOs are keener on accepting risk and undertaking 
risky projects (Barber & Odean, 2001; Goel & Thakor, 2008; Simon & Houghton, 2003). Li and 
Tang (2010) and Kahneman and Lovallo (1993) support this by acknowledging that overconfident 
CEOs largely underestimate uncertainty and the probability on failure. Hence, they do not perceive 
uncertainty in the same way as rational individuals would. Besides, Simon and Houghton (2003) 
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and Gervais, Heaton, and Odean (2011) also include ‘diagnostic cues’ in explaining why 
overconfident CEOs pursue riskier projects. It is proclaimed that overconfident CEOs overestimate 
positive cues, while ignoring negative or contradicting cues. The literature defines the latter 
phenomenon as a ‘confirmation bias’. As explained in section 2.1, individuals that suffer from a 
confirmation bias only explore for confirming evidence, while ignoring contradicting arguments 
(Russo & Schoemaker, 1989). Consequently, by exaggerating just the positive cues, overconfident 
CEOs overlook the probability of failure and accept risky projects (Galasso & Simcoe, 2011; Goel 
& Thakor, 2008). Furthermore, Goel and Thakor (2008) also disclose that overconfident 
individuals manifest lower cut-off signals in accepting projects. Whereas rational CEOs require 
higher payoffs to cover for incurring risk, overconfident CEOs embrace the same risk at a lower 
payoff probability. Therefore, overconfident CEOs engage in value-adding projects that rational 
CEOs would decline. Taken together, it appears that, because of systematic unawareness of 
uncertainty, underestimation of the probability on failure, and biased interpretation of diagnostic 
cues, overconfident CEOs are keener on taking risks. Moreover, it is exactly this risk-taking 
attitude which positively influences the exploration and innovation process (Hirshleifer et al., 
2012a; Levinthal & March, 1993).  
Subsequently, overconfident CEOs are also more enthusiastic about their beliefs than other CEOs. 
By having this attitude, overconfident CEOs convey their enthusiasm on other members within 
their organization (Russo & Schoemaker, 1989). Additionally, Botelho, Powell, Kincaid, and 
Wang (2017) emphasize that skilled CEOs engage for organizational impact by instilling 
confidence that they will lead the team in a successful manner. By having this particular 
enthusiastic attitude, overconfident CEOs are more likely to instill this confidence among their 
followers (Engelen et al., 2015). Moreover, Simon and Shrader (2012) argue that it is through the 
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enthusiastic mindset that overconfident CEOs increase colleagues’ motivation, enthusiasm, and 
perseverance in risk-taking. However, Engelen et al. (2015) also reveal how excessive 
overconfidence inhibits employee cooperation. When the overconfidence level becomes too high, 
CEOs tend to see new opportunities everywhere, and thus lose employees’ understanding. 
Typically, employees utilize a conception-matching process when judging if CEO overconfidence 
is supported. This implies that an organizational member will check if their beliefs regarding 
feasibility match with the CEO’s intentions (Carroll & Bandura, 1987). Nonetheless, this thesis 
argues that in general overconfident CEOs’ enthusiasm fosters organizational acceptance to 
undertake innovative activities (Stenmark, Shipman, & Mumford, 2011). Consequently, it follows 
that overconfident CEOs, by having an enthusiastic attitude and mindset, are more beneficial in 
implementing innovative capacity into an organization.  
Finally, Staw (1991), Levinthal and March (1993), and Engelen et al. (2015) also accentuate that 
overconfident CEOs are more action-oriented than other CEOs. Overconfident CEOs are more pro-
active, quick, and decisive when pursuing innovative activities. Instead of extensively collecting, 
examining, and discussing information, overconfident CEOs exhibit the ‘can do’ attitude by 
pushing innovation projects more rapidly. Moreover, the ‘herd-argument’ by Bernardo and Welch 
(2001) helps explain why overconfident CEOs are more action-oriented. This argument 
acknowledges that overconfident individuals are less likely to imitate their peers, by down 
weighing their input, and thus are more likely to explore their own beliefs. Since the latter 
individuals do not follow the herd, a higher level of self-determination is unveiled in executing the 
aspired innovation projects. Consequently, Bernardo and Welch (2001) state that overconfidence 
encourages organizations not to follow the main path that a herd is taking. It is exactly by being 
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action-oriented that overconfident CEOs faster depart from proven organizational practices 
(Engelen et al., 2015). 
Consequently, based on the above-mentioned ideas that overconfident CEOs are more risk-taking, 
have an enthusiastic mindset, and are action-oriented, this thesis hypothesizes the following: 
H1: CEO overconfidence positively impacts firm innovation 
2.5 CEO background as a moderator 
Next to overconfidence, a psychological or cognitive characteristic, CEO background also seems 
to have a notable effect on firm innovation (Barker III & Mueller, 2002; Papadakis & Bourantas, 
1998; Shane, 1992). Musteen et al. (2010) demonstrate that a different background may modify the 
decisions and beliefs that guide a CEO when making decisions regarding innovation. 
Consequently, it is vital to explore how a CEO’s background affects the relationship between CEO 
overconfidence and firm innovation. However, since the range of potential CEO background 
characteristics is rather extensive, this thesis focusses on two of the most salient characteristics, 
namely CEO tenure (Hambrick & Fukutomi, 1991) and power distance (Geletkanycz, 1997). 
2.5.1 CEO tenure 
CEO tenure, or the period of time that a CEO occupies the particular position of CEO has been 
demonstrated to notably influence organizational outcomes (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990). 
Nonetheless, no previous studies have explored whether tenure influences the relationship between 
CEO overconfidence and firm innovation. Hence, arguments in favor of both a positive and a 
negative impact can be found.  
Studies providing arguments in favor of a positive impact are issued by Musteen et al. (2010) and 
Brennan and Conroy (2013). These authors argue that CEO overconfidence grows over the time a 
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CEO is serving within an organization. Hence, respecting H1, it would be assumed that CEO tenure 
would reinforce the positive effect of CEO overconfidence on innovation capacity (Musteen et al., 
2010). Nonetheless, following most of the existing research, this thesis also refutes this line of 
reasoning.  
Firstly, Miller (1991) and McClelland, Liang, and Barker III (2010) argue that an increasing CEO 
tenure acts in favor of the status quo since longer-tenured CEOs grow stale, establish a known 
acceptance zone, and become stubborn in their management paradigms. As such, CEOs stick closer 
to proven organizational practices, and thus become less pro-active and action-oriented. 
Nonetheless, when a CEO becomes less action-oriented the positive impact of overconfidence on 
firm innovation decreases. Consequently, the longer a CEO’s tenure, the weaker the match between 
the organizational structure and the external environment, and thus the smaller impact CEO 
overconfidence has on firm innovation.  
Moreover, Hambrick and Fukutomi (1991) and Luo, Kanuri, and Andrews (2014) acknowledge 
that risk-appetite also evolves when observing the CEO’s life cycle. These authors reveal that 
during initial tenure CEOs are taking more risks, are more open to learning, and are exploring new 
projects. However, during later stages, CEOs tend to turn risk-averse, depend on internal 
knowledge, and lose alignment with the external environment. In support of this idea, Bereskin and 
Hsu (2013) also reported that incumbent CEOs are often underinvesting as they are in favor of a 
quiet life, instead of incurring risks. However, having a risk-taking attitude is one of the reasons 
why overconfident CEOs positively impact firm innovation. Consequently, as risk-appetite 
declines over a CEO’s life cycle, the impact of overconfident CEOs on firm innovation will be 
negatively moderated by tenure.  
12 
 
Consequently, bearing in mind that an increasing tenure reduces risk-appetite and action-
orientation, this thesis hypothesizes the following concerning the impact of CEO tenure on the 
relationship between CEO overconfidence and firm innovation. 
 H2: The positive association between CEO overconfidence and firm innovation will be 
negatively influenced by CEO tenure 
2.5.2 CEO power distance 
The main presumption of this thesis, as elaborated above, posits that CEO overconfidence 
positively impacts firm innovation. However, differences in national culture1 also play an important 
role in explaining the mindset of top executives, especially when considering the open-mindedness 
towards change (Geletkanycz, 1997). Previous research demonstrates how national culture 
influences beliefs (Ferris et al., 2013),  organizational behavior (Shane, 1993), and interpretations 
and responses to strategic issues, such as innovation (Schneider & De Meyer, 1991). Moreover, 
Schneider and De Meyer (1991) reveal that national culture is not just affecting proactivity 
behavior, but also internally and externally oriented actions. Consequently, depending on their 
national background, overconfident CEOs will also interpret the same environmental occurrence, 
in a different way (Shane et al., 1995).  
To quantitatively measure the effect of national culture on organizational values, Hofstede (2017) 
developed six dimensions which, together, comprise national culture. These dimensions consist of 
power distance, individualism, masculinity, uncertainty avoidance, long-term orientation, and 
indulgence. However, this thesis just focusses on the potential moderating effect power distance 
has on the relationship between CEO overconfidence and firm innovation. Power distance handles 
                                                          
1 Shane, Venkataraman, and MacMillan (1995) define national culture as the set of common values and thoughts 
that differentiate people from diverse nationalities. 
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the acceptance and distribution of power between organizational members (Hofstede, 2017). 
Executives which are low in power distance, pursue equal power distribution, decentralized 
authority, and informal communication channels between organizational members. On the 
contrary, executives which unveil a considerable degree of power distance, are in favor of unequal 
power distribution, bureaucracy, and a hierarchical organizational structure (Geletkanycz, 1997; 
Zhao, 2005). 
Because of the preference for a hierarchical organizational structure and unequal power 
distribution, power distant CEOs create weaker personal connections with their subordinates 
(Elenkov & Manev, 2005). For this reason, Shane (1993) also argues that power distant 
organizations lack informal communication channels between the different hierarchical levels. 
Moreover, Shane (1993) also indicates that subordinates in power distant organizations are 
overloaded with detailed tasks and tend to lose their creative freedom. Consequently, an 
overconfident CEO whose managerial beliefs are dominated by installing a high-power distance 
culture, discourages enthusiasm and endorses organizational silence (Morrison & Milliken, 2000).  
Moreover, Van der Vegt, Van de Vliert, and Huang (2005) illustrate that demographic diversity2, 
an environment in which many multinationals are embedded, is negatively associated with firm 
innovation when power distance is high. This is based on the idea that the input of subordinates, 
while diverse in outlook, may not be processed by overconfident managers as they consider these 
ideas as less competent. Again, subordinates feel underappreciated and unmotivated, lack trust, and 
generate significantly less follower performance (Avolio, Zhu, Koh, & Bhatia, 2004). 
                                                          
2 This premise was partially supported for the task-oriented demographics (organizational tenure and functional 






Taken together, by discouraging enthusiasm and motivation among subordinates (Simon & 
Shrader, 2012), and thus deteriorating one of the strengths of an overconfident CEO, it appears that 
power distance negatively impacts the positive relationship between CEO overconfidence and firm 
innovation. Furthermore, when taking into account that an individual’s national culture cannot be 
changed over time (Hofstede, 2017) , the above mentioned arguments lead to the third hypothesis.  
 H3: The positive association between CEO overconfidence and firm innovation will be 
negatively influenced when a CEO originates from a high-power distance country 
2.6 Conceptual model 
In summary of the developed hypotheses, Figure 1 displays the conceptual model that will be 
employed throughout the analysis. This model graphically illustrates the investigated relationships 
and depicts the expected effect between the variables. In the research design, these variables will 





















3 Research design 
3.1 Context 
To empirically investigate if higher levels of CEO overconfidence could be associated with a 
significantly higher amount of firm innovation this thesis took a firm-level perspective. Moreover, 
as firms are competing in an increasingly globalized and digitalized environment (Drucker, 2014), 
with innovation as a crucial component to survive, it would be scope-limiting to constrain the 
context to just one specific country. Therefore, differing from studies by Galasso and Simcoe 
(2011), Hirshleifer et al. (2012a), and Li and Tang (2010), this thesis does not just take either an 
American or Chinese perspective, but a global perspective. Moreover, a wide span of industries – 
ranging from the automotive, the FMCG, and the healthcare industry to the financial or 
technological industry - is examined in this research. 
Furthermore, a rather undervalued approach to measure CEO overconfidence, namely shareholder 
letters, is employed. These shareholder letters are an opportunity to take a language- and leadership 
based approach in quantifying overconfidence (Amernic et al., 2010; Fairhurst, 2008; Pondy et al., 
1989). However, as shareholder letters are often only issued by listed firms, this master’s thesis 
solely includes firms which are stock market listed and thus well-established. Moreover, by 
incorporating merely listed companies, more accurate CEO and innovation data can be employed. 
And finally, this research is situated in the recent past. By employing innovation and CEO data 
from the period 2008-2016, the drawn results and interpretations are valuable in the current time 
perspective. As overconfidence was often denounced as an important trigger of several speculative 
bubbles in the last decades3 and the global financial crisis in 2007-2008, it is interesting to examine 
                                                          
3 The dotcom bubble in the United States (1995-2000), the housing bubble in the United States (2002-2006), the 
Irish and Spanish property bubbles (the 2000s), and the Chinese stock bubbles (2003-2007). 
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if CEO overconfidence is still as explicit as before (Gladwell, 2009). Studies which employed 
datasets that handled the time periods before the global financial crisis, might be outdated and offer 
irrelevant insights into today’s environment. Hence, by taking a fresh point of view, enriching 
insights and implications can be obtained. 
In summary, this research considers well-established multinationals from diverse continents, 
countries, and industries during the period 2008-2016, to get an accurate and up-to-date 
understanding about the relationship between CEO overconfidence and firm innovation. 
3.2 Sample and procedure  
To study the impact of CEO overconfidence on firm innovation we examine a large sample of 155 
firms4, drawn from a wide range of industries, during the period 2008-2016. To obtain the thesis-
relevant information for all these firms, diverse data sources were consulted. Annual reports were 
used to obtain the CEO-related data, while the corresponding shareholder letters were employed to 
measure CEO overconfidence. And subsequently, this dataset was amplified with firm-related 
information from the Worldscope database.  
Practically, this implies that annual reports were collected for all 155 companies during the period 
2008-2016. However, during this period, some firms became delisted or even went bankrupt. 
Therefore, it was not possible to acquire all the annual reports over the entire period 2008-2016. 
Subsequently, CEO shareholder letters were extracted from the corresponding annual reports. This 
procedure yielded approximately 1255 different shareholder letters. Next, these letters were 
scanned by LIWC5 - a linguistic and computerized text analysis program – to reveal the expressed 
                                                          
4 The included firms cannot be released due to confidentiality issues. 




level of CEO overconfidence. However, not all of these shareholder letters could be taken into 
further analysis as corresponding innovation data appeared unavailable. 
The final sample, for which complete information was available for all variables, consists of 1041 
entries. Moreover, this sample contains firms from over 19 different countries and having notably 
different magnitudes (ranging from minimally 1500 to over half a million employees). Besides, 
when considering the appointed CEOs, these have 26 different nationalities and an incumbency 
ranging from one to thirty-one years. Also, it is remarkable that of the 273 unique CEOs, only six 
are female. Consequently, it is concluded that the sample is large and diverse enough to gain 
statistically correct insights on the effect of CEO overconfidence on firm innovation. 
3.3 Measures  
3.3.1 CEO overconfidence 
To determine CEO overconfidence, this thesis employs shareholder letters. When using 
shareholder letters, the most interesting insights about the tone, attitude, and mindset of the top 
management are revealed. Moreover, this methodology is in line with the growing importance of 
leadership as a language-based phenomenon (Amernic et al., 2010; Conaway & Wardrope, 2010; 
Yadav, Prabhu, & Chandy, 2007). In support, previous studies by Brennan and Conroy (2013) and 
McClelland et al. (2010) have already proven that shareholder letters are a valuable medium 
through which particular CEO values can be measured. 
Subsequently, LIWC, a computerized text analysis program, is used to measure the level of CEO 
overconfidence within the shareholder letters. LIWC enables one to analyze texts and subsequently 
reflect the expressed emotions, thinking styles, concerns, and psychological states (LIWC, 2017). 
Based on linguistic and psychological algorithms, LIWC compares each word in the shareholder 
letters against a user-defined dictionary to obtain a score for CEO overconfidence. Following the 
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methodology of Malmendier and Tate (2008), Hribar and Yang (2010), and Hirshleifer et al. 
(2012a), different word categories are constructed in the LIWC dictionary for both ‘confident’ and 
‘cautious’. The word category ‘confident’ contains the terms “confident”, “confidence”, 
“optimistic”, “optimism” and other related synonyms. Moreover, the word category ‘cautious’ 
consists of the terms “pessimistic”, “pessimism”, “reliable”, “steady”, “practical”, “conservative”, 
“frugal”, “cautious”, “gloomy” and other related synonyms6. Next, by using Equation 1, the 
overconfidence level can be measured for each CEO i in year t. Hence, when 𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑖 expresses a 
higher score on ‘confident’ than on ‘cautious’ at time t, the latter will be categorized as an 
overconfident CEO, and vice versa. 
𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 =  {
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑥𝑖,𝑡 > 𝑦𝑖,𝑡
0 𝑖𝑓 𝑥𝑖,𝑡 ≤ 𝑦𝑖,𝑡
 
where 𝑥𝑖 =
′ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡′𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒,                         
𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑦𝑖 =
′ 𝐶𝑎𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠′𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 
Equation 1 - CEO overconfidence measure 
By operationalizing CEO overconfidence through a dichotomous variable, the research eventually 
contains 656 overconfident (±63%) and 385 non-overconfident (±37%) data points. Furthermore, 
this frequency of overconfident CEOs is in line with the 61% as argued by the option-based 
measure by Hirshleifer et al. (2012a). 
3.3.2 Firm innovation 
Previous studies by Griffith, Huergo, Mairesse, and Peters (2006) and Griffith et al. (2006) mention 
the wide-spread use of R&D to measure innovation. Hence, this thesis also proposes R&D 
expenditure as a robust proxy for firm innovation. R&D expenditure reflects the amount of input 
                                                          
6 An exact list of the words that were assigned to each word category is added in Appendix A.I. 
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spent on innovation. Thus, it shows if a company and its CEO value innovation. When a CEO is 
not spending capital on the initial phase, no future innovation can be expected either (Barker III & 
Mueller, 2002). Furthermore, R&D expenditure also has a positive association with patents (Artz, 
Norman, Hatfield, & Cardinal, 2010) and other innovation outputs (Mairesse & Mohnen, 2005). 
Consequently, by considering a firm’s R&D expenditure, one gets a good overview on the capital 
that a CEO intends to invest on innovation. In addition, R&D also appears to be positively related 
to innovation outputs.  
Besides, it is remarked that, in line with the R&D literature (Barker III & Mueller, 2002), R&D 
expenditure is not normally distributed. This is caused by variations in R&D expenditures when 
examining a broad range of industries. However, approximately normal distributions are required 
for the dependent variable when employing statistical tests. Hence, to improve the skewness and 
kurtosis, a natural log-transformation was applied as it deals best with a substantial positive skew 
(Burns & Burns, 2008). Subsequently, a more normal R&D expenditure distribution was obtained7. 
Finally, following research by Barker III and Mueller (2002), this thesis assumes a direct link 
between a CEO’s characteristics and firm innovation. This implies that no significant time lag is 
expected between the installation of a CEO and the effect on R&D expenditure. Nonetheless, when 
one would consider an innovation output like patents, a one year lag should be taken into 
consideration before CEO characteristics have an impact (Hirshleifer et al., 2012a). 
3.3.3 CEO tenure 
The tenure or time span that a CEO has been managing an organization is most commonly 
expressed in years (Hambrick & Fukutomi, 1991). To obtain this data, the thesis employed the 
                                                          
7 Skewness and kurtosis decreased notably. Besides, also the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk tests and the 
QQ-plots exhibit improved normality. The precise normality outcomes can be found in Appendix B.I.1 
20 
 
annual reports. Subsequently, at each time t, the CEO tenure was adjusted to have a fit with the 
corresponding year. Otherwise, it would be fallacious to draw conclusions about the longitudinal 
effect of CEO tenure on firm innovation. Furthermore, by having a dataset that encompasses CEOs 
with a wide range of experience in their role – ranging from one year to thirty-one years – useful 
insights about the moderating effect of CEO tenure can be obtained.   
3.3.4 CEO power distance 
When examining the influence of a CEO’s national culture on the relationship between CEO 
overconfidence and firm innovation, this thesis just focusses on the influence of power distance. 
Accordingly, only Hofstede’s power distance scores were retrieved8 and linked to the CEOs, based 
on their nationalities. By doing so, each 𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑖 has during time t a fitting national power distance 
score. Hence, it is assumed that a CEO has approximately the same value set as an average 
individual of his/her country. However, since the Hofstede measures repeatedly have shown their 
robustness and reliability, this assumption is valid (Shane et al., 1995). 
3.3.5 Control variables 
To regulate for external variables that might influence the relationship between CEO 
overconfidence and firm innovation, several control variables are employed. These can be divided 
into two categories: the CEO and firm level control variables. 
First, in terms of the CEO level, ‘gender’ was taken into consideration by including a dummy 
variable (0=female, 1=male). It appears that male executives are more action-oriented, take more 
significant actions and perform more acquisitions, when compared to female executives (Barber & 
                                                          




Odean, 2001; Huang & Kisgen, 2013). Consequently, it is necessary to control the gender variable 
to rid its effect on the relationship between CEO overconfidence and firm innovation.  
Furthermore, control variables also were added on the firm level. The most important one is 
‘revenue’. Since the absolute amount of R&D expenditure is inherently related to firm size and 
revenue, it would be inaccurate not to control for this magnitude-related factor (Hirshleifer et al., 
2012a). Otherwise, results would be biased by bigger firms that are generating a higher amount of 
revenues, but are not necessarily being more innovative. Moreover, Tobin’s Q (market value/asset 
value) was also added as a control variable, since a higher Tobin’s Q might be associated with 
higher R&D expenditures (Hirshleifer et al., 2012a). Accordingly, by including Tobin’s Q, 
financial and valuation effects are filtered out and the focus remains on innovation. Moreover, as 
both firm level control variables were suffering from a notable positive skew9, natural logarithm 
transformations were employed to normalize the data. And finally, following the approach of 
Galasso and Simcoe (2011), all the firm-level control variables were lagged by one year, for 
obvious reasons of simultaneity.  
3.4 Analytical strategy  
To investigate the relationships, as expressed in the hypotheses and conceptual model in Figure 1, 
an appropriate analytical strategy must be developed.  
Firstly, correlations are examined as they provide a first insight in how pairs of variables relate. It 
allows one to measure a first degree of correspondence between variables. Nonetheless, when 
incorporating more than one independent variable, a multiple regression is better in estimating the 
relationship between several variables. It allows for interpretation about the co-occurrence of 
                                                          




several variables. Hence, in this way, it is possible to statistically gauge the association between 
CEO overconfidence and firm innovation, and to examine when CEO tenure and CEO power 
distance are influencing the latter relationship. Furthermore, a multiple regression also quantifies 
which amount of overall variance in R&D expenditure is explained by the independent variables 
(Burns & Burns, 2008). The precise multiple regression model that is employed to conduct the 
statistical analysis is depicted in Equation 2. 
        𝐿𝑛(𝑅&𝐷 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒) = 
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 +  𝛽4
∗ 𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 ∗ Tenure +  𝛽5 ∗ 𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 +  𝛽6
∗ 𝐿𝑛(𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒) + 𝛽7 ∗ 𝐿𝑛(𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛
′𝑠 𝑄) + 𝛽8 ∗ 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 + 𝛽9 ∗ Time effect +  ε 
Equation 2 - Moderation Model 
This equation reflects the anticipated relationship between the dependent variable on the left hand-
side, and the independent, moderation, and control variables on the right hand-side. Moreover, the 
variable ‘time effect’ is also incorporated into the regression model. This time variable consists of 
eight dummy variables, and thus reflecting the period 2008-2016. By including this variable, the 
influence of systematic time-effects is prevented. Furthermore, it is also noted that all further 






4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Means, standard deviations, and correlations for all model variables (including the control 
variables) are exhibited in Table 1 to describe the basic characteristics of the data. Regarding the 
dependent variable, our average firm was spending approximately 5.68 million dollars on ln(R&D 
Expenditure). However, due to the log transformation, accurate interpretation of this number is 
complicated. When looking back at the original R&D data, it is realized that the average firm spent 
1200 million dollars on research and development with a standard deviation of more than 1700 
million dollars. Hence, it was exactly due to this skewness, that a log transformation was exercised. 
Furthermore, in terms of the principal independent variable, CEO overconfidence, it is noticed that 
this thesis is dealing with a rather overconfident set of CEOs. More than half (63%) of the included 
shareholder letters conveyed overconfident beliefs.  
                   
Column1 Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
R&D expenditure (ln) 5.68 2.04 -       
Overconfidence 0.63 0.48 -0.055 -      
CEO Tenure 1.48 0.81 -0.194 0.015 -     
CEO Power 43.53 14.64 0.025 -0.07 0.158 -    
Revenue (ln) 9.56 1.25 0.740 -0.061 -0.173 0.093 -   
Tobin's Q (ln) 0.36 0.37 0.166 0.070 0.039 -0.069 0.042 -  
CEO Gender 0.97 0.16 -0.041 -0.001 0.079 0.460 -0.107 -0.039 - 
Note: N=1041. 
All correlations with an absolute value > 0.06 are significant at p≤0.05 
Table 1 - Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations 
An inspection of the correlation matrix indicates no significant correlation between CEO 
overconfidence and R&D expenditure. Additionally, Table 1 also suggests a strong correlation 
between the independent variables CEO power and CEO Tenure. 
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To further investigate this disclosure, Figure 2 graphically presents the mean CEO power score for 
several levels of CEO tenure. Again, it appears that a longer CEO tenure is positively associated 
with a higher CEO power score. This could imply multicollinearity, a phenomenon that destabilizes 
and complicates the interpretation of coefficient estimates during a regression. Furthermore, since 
CEO power also correlates significantly with another independent variable, namely CEO 
overconfidence, it is decided to exclude CEO power from further analysis. 
Consequently, due to significant correlation with the other independent variables, no support will 
be found for H3, which predicted that the positive association between CEO overconfidence and 
firm innovation would be negatively influenced when a CEO originates from a high-power distance 
country.  
4.2 Hypotheses testing 
Correlations are useful in gaining a first indication about the relationships between two variables, 
but they do not indicate the precise effect, nor the impact of multiple independent variables working 
together (Burns & Burns, 2008). Rather, correlations measure the impact of a single variable. 
Figure 2 - Mean CEO power for each level of CEO tenure 
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Hence, to understand the effect of multiple independent variables on R&D expenditure, a multiple 
regression is necessary. 
To execute a linear multiple regression, several conditions must be fulfilled. Most importantly, 
multicollinearity between independent variables must be avoided. The Variance Inflation Factor 
(VIF) is the most accurate measure to control for multicollinearity. Generally, when a VIF is 
exceeding a value of 10, multicollinearity concerns should be raised. Hence, Appendix B.II shows 
that, after leaving out CEO power, all VIF scores are well below 5. Furthermore, it is also preferred 
to comprise a big enough sample size and to have approximately normal distributions (Burns & 
Burns, 2008). Hence, the assumptions for performing a multiple regression are respected.  
Table 2 presents the results for the multiple regression that are performed. In model (1) only the 
control variables are considered. Afterwards, in model (2), the focal variables are also inserted. 
And eventually, in model (3) the moderation term between CEO overconfidence and CEO tenure 
is added. In this way, it is ensured that the regression firstly restrains for the control variables. 
Furthermore, by adding the focal and moderation variables just in the second and third block, it is 
possible to examine how much these variables explain – on top of the control variables - R&D 
expenditure. Furthermore, it is also noteworthy that all three models include year fixed effects by 
incorporating 8 dummy variables for the period 2008-2016. Consequently, it can be assured that 
the results are not influenced by systematic year effects. 
All the variables in model (1) have a significant impact on R&D Expenditure, manifesting their 
importance as control variables. Taken together, they explain 57.3% of the variance in R&D 
expenditure. Subsequently, model (3) represents the multiple regression between R&D expenditure 
as the dependent variable, CEO overconfidence and CEO tenure as the focal variables, and CEO 
overconfidence*CEO tenure as the moderation variable, while control variables are still included. 
26 
 
CEO tenure is included as a focal variable, although not directly related to a hypothesis, as it needed 
to construct the moderation variable. Model (3) attains a F-value of 104.09 (p<0.001), implying 
that the overall regression model is strongly significant.  
Nonetheless, CEO overconfidence does not significantly contribute to the interpretation of R&D 
expenditure. CEO overconfidence was found to have an insignificantly positive impact on R&D 
expenditure (𝛽=0.168, t= 1.244, p=0.214). This is not in line with the expectations and 
consequently provides no support for H1. Furthermore, in terms of the moderation variable CEO 
overconfidence*CEO tenure, a strongly significantly negative coefficient was found (𝛽 =-0.044, 
t=-2.497, p=0.013). Based on this result, it is deduced that the moderation variable significantly 
influences the relationship between CEO overconfidence and R&D expenditure in a negative 
manner. And consequently, support is provided for H2. 
Furthermore, Table 2 indicates that, after incorporation of the independent variables, model (3) has 
an adjusted R-squared of 58.1%. Hence, on top of the control variables, the independent variables 
explain an additional 0.8% of the variance in R&D expenditure. The focal variables explain 0.6%, 
while the moderation variable clarifies 0.2% of the variance in R&D expenditure. On first sight, 
these percentages may seem minor. But, bearing in mind that R&D expenditure totals hundreds of 
millions, understanding each percentage point is essential. For the average firm in this sample, the 





Dependent variable: R&D expenditure (ln) 
Independent variables Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
  
Control variables Focal variables (H1) CEO Tenure (H2) 
  β S.E β S.E β S.E 
Constant -6.888*** 0.446 -6.498*** 0.456 -6.633*** 0.458 
          
Control variables         
Revenue (ln) 1.205*** 0.033 1.179*** 0.034 1.176*** 0.033 
Tobin's Q (ln) 0.786*** 0.116 0.811*** 0.116 0.808*** 0.116 
CEO gender 0.581** 0.261 0.653** 0.260 0.650** 0.260 
          
Focal variables         
CEO overconfidence    -0.093 0.085 0.168 0.135 
CEO tenure    -0.034*** 0.009 -0.006 0.014 
          
Moderating variables         
CEO overconfidence * 
CEO tenure       
-0.044** 0.018 
              
Observations 1041 1041 1041 
F-value 128.03 111.05 104.09 
R 0.760 0.764 0.766 
Adjusted R-squared 0.573 0.579 0.581 
    
Note: Results from multiple linear regression model. All models include year fixed effects by 
incorporating 8 time dummies (2008 as reference year). Confidence levels: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
Complete SPSS-output is added in Appendix B.II 
 
Table 2 -  Results from multiple regression. 
4.3 Effect of industry innovativeness 
As the obtained results do not provide support for the main hypothesis (H1), the thesis explores 
whether industry innovativeness might have an influence on the obtained results. This is based on 
research by Hirshleifer et al. (2012a) which indicates that the relationship between CEO 
overconfidence and innovation might depend on the considered industry. Consequently, the 
original sample was divided into one sample containing firms active in innovative industries, and 
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one sample containing firms active in non-innovative industries. To define whether an industry is 
considered innovative or not, the thesis employed the research by Hirshleifer, Low, and Teoh 
(2012b). These authors calculated the proportion of innovative years for all industries (based on 
the SIC10 codes). Whenever an industry crossed the cutoff value of 75% innovative years, the 
industry was labeled as innovative11. Subsequently, two new regression models were run in SPPS 
for both the innovative and non-innovative industries. The results from these regressions are 
reported in Table 3.  
When interpreting Table 3, it appears that industry innovativeness has a significant impact on the 
obtained results. In terms of the effect of CEO overconfidence on R&D expenditure, it follows that 
CEO overconfidence has no significant influence (𝛽=0.030, t=0.174, p= 0.862) when dealing with 
an innovative industry. However, for non-innovative industries, CEO overconfidence significantly 
affects the amount of R&D expenditures (𝛽=0.393, t= 2.105, p= 0.036). Consequently, partial 
support is provided for H1. Depending on the innovativeness of the industry, the relationship 
between CEO overconfidence and firm innovation holds. 
Furthermore, it also follows that the effect of CEO overconfidence*CEO tenure, the moderating 
variable, on the relationship between CEO overconfidence and R&D expenditure depends on the 
industry innovativeness. When considering non-innovative industries, H2 is supported as tenure is 
strongly significant (𝛽= -0.054, t= -2.456, p= 0.014). Nonetheless, for non-innovative industries, 
Table 3 only presents support for H2 (𝛽= -0.045, t= -1.765, p= 0.078) when taking a significance 
level of 0.1. When taking a significance level of 0.05, no support is provided for H2. Consequently, 
depending on the innovativeness of the industry, there again exist differences. However, in general, 
                                                          
10 Standard Industrial Classification 
11 Appendix A.II demonstrates the proportion of innovative years (%) for each industry and whether an industry is 
labelled as innovative or non-innovative 
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the regressions indicate a strongly negative influence of the moderating variable on the relationship 
between CEO overconfidence and firm innovation.  
Dependent variable: R&D expenditure (ln) 
Independent variables Model 4 Model 5 
  Innovative Industry Non-innovative Industry 
  β S.E β S.E 
Constant -5.665*** 0.518 -10.767*** 0.784 
       
Control variables      
Revenue (ln) 1.131*** 0.036 1.353*** 0.058 
Tobin's Q (ln) 1.055*** 0.172 1.172*** 0.150 
CEO gender 0.293 0.277 2.372*** 0.485 
       
Focal variables      
CEO overconfidence 0.030 0.171 0.393** 0.187 
CEO tenure 0.018 0.021 0.011 0.017 
       
Moderating variables      
CEO overconfidence * 
CEO tenure 
-0.045* 0.025 -0.054** 0.022 
Observations 563 477 
F-value 77.80 56.13 
R 0.815 0.793 
Adjusted R-squared 0.656 0.618 
Note: Results from multiple linear regression model when splitting the data by 'Innovative Industry'.  
All models include year fixed effects by incorporating 8 time dummies (2008 as reference year). 
Confidence levels: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Complete SPSS-output is added in Appendix B.III 
   
Table 3- Results from multiple regression, divided by industry innovativeness 
And finally, as shown in Table 3, incorporating the innovativeness of the industry increases the 
explanatory power (adjusted R-squared) to respectively 65.6% and 61.8%.  Together with the 
strong significance of ‘innovative industry’ (t=14.638, p<0.001), this implies that the 





In this thesis, the impact of CEO overconfidence, a cognitive bias contrasting standard economic 
models and rational decision making, on firm innovation was studied. Particularly, it was 
hypothesized that overconfident CEOs are more risk-taking, have a more enthusiastic mindset, and 
are more action-oriented, which in turn will lead to a higher level of firm innovation. Moreover, it 
was also predicted that CEO background would have an influence on the latter relationship. Both 
CEO tenure and CEO power distance were expected to negatively affect the relationship between 
CEO overconfidence and firm innovation. 
5.1 Summary of findings 
Employing shareholder letters to measure CEO overconfidence, this thesis demonstrates that over 
the 2008-2016 period, overconfident CEOs, managing established multinationals active in non-
innovative industries, spend significantly more on research & development, an initial step towards 
successful firm innovation, than non-overconfident CEOs do. However, for overconfident CEOs 
running multinationals in innovative industries, this relationship does not hold. For these 
multinationals there exists a positive, but non-significant relationship between CEO 
overconfidence and firm innovation. Furthermore, this thesis also revealed that CEO tenure 
negatively influences the relationship between CEO overconfidence and firm innovation for both 
innovative (p<0.1) and non-innovative industries (p<0.05). Consequently, there exists a decreasing 
effect of CEO overconfidence over time. Overconfident and shortly-tenured CEOs more 
significantly impact firm innovation than longer-tenured overconfident CEOs do.  
5.2 Theoretical contributions 
This thesis has contributed to the existing tone at the top and UET literature by exploring the 
influence of CEO overconfidence – a cognitive bias that influences the managerial beliefs of the 
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most important executive in the top management team – on firm innovation. Previous studies by 
Galasso and Simcoe (2011) and Hirshleifer et al. (2012a) also looked into this relationship, but did 
not consider the impact of CEO tenure. Moreover, by employing the yearly shareholder letters to 
measure CEO overconfidence, this thesis also commits to the growing importance of leadership as 
a language- and meaning-based construct (Amernic et al., 2010; Pondy et al., 1989).  
Subsequently, the next paragraphs will further elaborate on the theoretical contributions that have 
been realized based on the results. The insight that there only exists a positively significant 
relationship between CEO overconfidence and firm innovation in non-innovative industries, is 
remarkable. On the one hand, the positive relationship between CEO overconfidence and 
innovation, was hypothesized and in line with previous research (Engelen et al., 2015; Galasso & 
Simcoe, 2011). Nonetheless, on the other hand, this result contradicts the finding of Hirshleifer et 
al. (2012a) that overconfident managers only obtain more innovation in innovative industries. A 
possible explanation is that, since multinationals in innovative industries are already aggressively 
pursuing innovation opportunities (Miller, 1991), employees do not perceive added value in an 
overconfident CEO. When CEOs dominate other organizational members, who are already 
innovation-oriented, it may reduce their enthusiasm and inhibit full cooperation (Engelen et al., 
2015). However, for multinationals active in non-innovative industries, overconfident CEOs who 
dominate and take on challenging opportunities might turn out beneficial for firm innovation. When 
having a CEO who is risk-taking and action-oriented, the reluctance towards innovation might be 
overcome (Miller & Friesen, 1982).  
A second conceivable explanation might be that multinationals in non-innovative industries 
actively pursue overconfident CEOs to compensate for innovation-aversion in the industry. By 
realizing that overconfident CEOs are effective in engaging in difficult tasks and in building 
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awareness and enthusiasm for new opportunities, these multinationals can outweigh the non-
innovativeness of their industry. Hence, hiring overconfident CEOs might more significantly 
impact firm innovation in non-innovative industries. Besides, as the thesis only considers well-
established and successful multinationals, the incorporated firms might also be more innovative 
than one would expect when considering their non-innovative industry. Nonetheless, future 
research remains necessary to investigate why industry innovativeness impacts the relationship 
between CEO overconfidence and firm innovation. 
Besides, the outcome that CEO tenure negatively influences the relationship between CEO 
overconfidence and firm innovation is in conformance with research by Luo et al. (2014), 
McClelland et al. (2010), and Barker III and Mueller (2002). Accordingly, when tenure increases, 
overconfident CEOs grow stale in the saddle and commit to fewer strategic changes such as firm 
innovation. The risk-taking and action-oriented attitude of a new and overconfident CEO 
disappears and transforms into a more ‘conservative’ one. Incumbent CEOs prefer a quiet life and 
start cutting R&D costs to maximize short-term earnings (Bereskin & Hsu, 2013). Nonetheless, 
when combining this with an overconfident and dominant attitude, firm innovation will decline. 
Finally, and contrary to the expectations, CEO power distance, could not be incorporated into the 
analysis due to its strong correlation with both CEO overconfidence and CEO tenure. Hence, it 
appears that CEOs with a longer tenure also install a more power distant corporate culture. This 
finding is consistent with the theory that executives’ personality strengthens over tenure (Barker 
III & Mueller, 2002). Furthermore, the analysis also reveals that power distant CEOs are strongly 
associated with overconfident CEOs. Power distance could reflect the dominance and action-
orientation that overconfident CEO exhibit. Accordingly, it is an interesting element for future 
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research to examine whether power distant CEOs tend to be longer-tenured and demonstrate higher 
levels of overconfidence.  
5.3 Practical implications 
Apart from the theoretical implications, this thesis also specifies several practical implications for 
multinationals and their corresponding board of directors when contracting CEOs. 
Firstly, it is inferred that not all well-established multinationals benefit from hiring an 
overconfident CEO. Multinationals active in non-innovative industries could significantly improve 
their innovation potential by hiring an overconfident CEO. Nonetheless, in innovative industries, 
an overconfident CEO does not significantly improve firm innovation. Consequently, this is an 
important insight for a board of directors when considering their contracting practices. Since 
overconfidence improves firm innovation in non-innovative industries, it is important to screen 
potential CEOs on this criterion. 
Moreover, another practical implication is related to the insight that CEO tenure negatively impacts 
the influence of CEO overconfidence on firm innovation. To maximize the impact of CEO 
overconfidence on firm innovation, this type of CEOs should have been recently appointed. When 
an overconfident CEO has a longer tenure, the negative effects of overconfidence will start 
outweighing the positive ones. Consequently, it is concluded that overconfident CEOs have a 
decreasing impact over time. On the short-term, overconfidence will boost firm innovation. 
Nonetheless, on the longer-term, the risk-taking, action-oriented, and enthusiastic mindset of an 
overconfident CEO will vanish and turn into a stubborn and stale one. Thus, when hiring an 
overconfident CEO, this time aspect should always be taken into consideration. If a multinational 
aspires to establish an ever-growing innovative corporate culture, overconfident CEOs cannot 
govern for long periods and will even have to be replaced frequently.  
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5.4 Limitations & Future Research 
This thesis also contains some noteworthy limitations and subjects for future research, which are 
illuminated in this section. 
A first limitation consists in working with shareholder letters. Although shareholder letters more 
accurately assess the construct ‘overconfidence’ and reflect the speaker’s characteristics, there are 
also some drawbacks (Hill et al., 2014). Shareholder letters can suffer from impression 
management when it, instead of objectively informing shareholders about the status of the firm, 
turns into public relations collaboration. Furthermore, it can also be argued whether it solely 
represents the beliefs and thought processes of a CEO (Yadav et al., 2007). However, Amernic et 
al. (2010) contradict this by arguing that CEOs take shareholder letters seriously, as it carries a 
personal claim through their name and signature. 
Furthermore, a second limitation concerns the use of R&D to measure innovation. As mentioned 
in the ‘research design’, R&D is a wide-spread proxy for innovation output since both constructs 
are positively related and since R&D data is easier to obtain. However, R&D only handles the 
capital that is spent to initiate innovation. And whether it eventually leads to successful innovation 
is not assured. For instance, some multinationals could have spent a substantial amount on R&D, 
but not realized noteworthy improvements or innovation. Consequently, to further validate the 
obtained insights in this thesis, future research should explore whether the insights still hold when 
innovation is measured by innovation outputs, such as patents or citations. 
Subsequently, based on the obtained outcomes, some other ideas for future research are provided. 
A first topic for future research is why industry innovativeness has an impact on the significance 
of the relationship between CEO overconfidence and firm innovation. Since it has been shown that 
CEO overconfidence only has a positive impact on innovation in non-innovative industries, gaining 
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a deeper understanding in the overall rationale would be value-adding for future CEO-contracting 
practices. Two possible explanations were provided in the theoretical contributions, but future 
research should indicate whether these are valid.  
Furthermore, since it is demonstrated that CEO tenure has a negative impact on the relationship 
between CEO overconfidence and innovation, it would be interesting to examine at which tenure 
overconfident CEOs in non-innovative industries, and thus intrinsically more innovative CEOs, 
turn conservative. To find out, subgroups of CEO tenure (low-medium-high) could be constructed 
and compared. In this manner, additional insights about during which tenure-cycle overconfidence 
positively impact firm innovation could be achieved. Furthermore, it could also be a subject for 
future research to explore whether tenure would still have a negative impact when one considers 
non-profit organizations. In contrast with the incorporated profit-oriented multinationals, CEOs of 
non-profit organizations might take more risks closer to their departure or retirement as they pursue 
an ideal, rather than optimizing firm profitability (Luo et al., 2014).  Consequently, for these cases, 
it could be that CEO tenure positively impacts the relationship between CEO overconfidence and 
firm innovation. To investigate this theory, another sample should be constructed. The current 
sample only includes well-established and profit-oriented multinationals and accordingly results 
cannot be generalized for the non-profit industry. 
And lastly, based on the reported correlations in Table 1, it could be insightful to examine whether 
power distant CEOs systematically demonstrate higher levels of overconfidence. If this appears to 





In a rapidly changing and globalizing environment innovation became a priority. If a firm is not 
able to innovate, it faces decline and even extinction (Drucker, 2014). As such, it is important to 
understand which factors foster or hamper an innovative corporate culture. Therefore, following 
upper-echelons theory (Hambrick & Mason, 1984), this thesis investigated how CEO 
overconfidence, an omnipresent cognitive bias, influences the amount of firm innovation. At first 
glance, overconfidence is in contrast with rational decision-making and standard economic models. 
But, exactly because overconfident CEOs have a more risk-taking, action-oriented, and enthusiastic 
mindset, this type of managers might be better suited to perform challenging tasks, such as 
innovation. 
In the context of well-established multinationals over the period 2008-2016, this thesis provides 
empirical evidence that CEO overconfidence does positively stimulate firm innovation. 
Nonetheless, this relationship only holds for non-innovative industries. Consequently, in these 
industries, CEO overconfidence is an important element to foster innovation. It is therefore 
important that future leadership development and hiring practices in non-innovative industries 
understand the importance of overconfidence in promoting innovation. Meanwhile, in innovative 
industries, overconfident CEOs do not have an impact on innovation.  
Moreover, it is also discovered that CEO tenure negatively influences the relationship between 
CEO overconfidence and firm innovation for both innovative and non-innovative industries. 
Nonetheless, in non-innovative industries the impact of CEO tenure is more significant. In other 
words, it is concluded that if an overconfident CEO remains in charge for a longer time, a known 
acceptance zone is established, and risk appetite diminishes. However, it is mainly by having a 
risk-taking attitude that overconfident CEOs are able to spur innovation (Levinthal & March, 
37 
 
1993). To maintain innovation, organizations with overconfident CEOs must ensure that their CEO 
is not governing for too long. Otherwise, the influence of CEO overconfidence might disappear (in 
non-innovative industries) or even turn negative (in innovative industries). By gaining the insight 
that there exists a decreasing effect of CEO overconfidence over the period that a CEO is managing 
an organization, the thesis elaborates on the existing research by Galasso and Simcoe (2011) and 
Hirshleifer et al. (2012a).  
And lastly, it was not possible to explore whether CEO power distance influences the relationship 
between CEO overconfidence and firm innovation. The correlations between CEO power distance 
and both CEO tenure and CEO overconfidence were too strong, and would erratically impact the 
regression model. Nonetheless, it is a valuable insight that an increase in CEO power strongly 
coincides with an increase in CEO overconfidence.  
Taken together, by unveiling the positive impact that CEO overconfidence has on firm innovation 
for well-established multinationals in non-innovative industries, and by indicating the negative 
impact of CEO tenure on the relationship between CEO overconfidence and firm innovation, this 
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Appendix A. Lists 
I. LIWC dictionary 
Overconfident: adventuresome, adventurous, assured, audacious, bold, brash, bright, certain, clear, 
confidence, confident, daring, decisive, doubtless, encouraging, fair, hopeful, hope, hubris, likely, 
optimism, optimistic, overconfidence, overconfident, overoptimism, overoptimistic, positive, 
promising, rosy, stout, sure, uphesitating, upbeat, venturesome, venturous 
 
Cautious: adverse, alert, bearish, careful, cautious, circumspect, chary, conservative, considerate, 
defeatist, despairing, disadvantage, downbeat, drawback, frugal, gingerly, gloomy, guarded, 
heedful, hopeless, negative, observant, overpessimistic, pessimism, pessimist, pessimistic, 
practical, reliable, safe, secure, solid, steady, thoughtful, unfavorable, watchful 
 
II. Innovative and non-innovative industries12 
 
Industry SIC Proportion of innovative years (%) Innovative?13 
    
Food & drink products 20 0 No 
Tobacco products 21 0 No 
Apparel & other finished products 23 9 No 
Lumber & wood products, excl. furniture 24 64 No 
Paper & allied products 26 91 Yes 
Printing & publishing 27 82 Yes 
Chemicals & pharmaceutical products 28 18 No 
Rubber & plastic products 30 64 No 
Stone, clay, glass, concrete products 32 91 Yes 
Primary metal 33 18 No 
Commercial mach & computer hardware 35 100 Yes 
Electric equip & electronic equipment 36 100 Yes 
Transportation equipment 37 91 Yes 
Measuring, control & medical equipment 38 100 Yes 
Consumer goods 39 100 Yes 
Communications 48 100 Yes 
Wholesale - durable goods 50 9 No 
Business services 73 100 Yes 
Services - health 80 91 Yes 
                                                          
12 Based on the research by Hirshleifer et al. (2012b) 
13 Cutoff level has been set at a proportion of innovative years of 75%. In this way, only industries with a notable 
proportion of innovative years are labeled as innovative. 
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Appendix B. SPSS Output 
I. Normality tests & plots 
Considering the given dataset, several variables are suffering from a strong skew and kurtosis. To 
normalize these variables natural log-transformation were applied. Hence, the following 
subsections present the skewness, kurtosis14, Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, Shapiro-Wilk test15, and 
QQ-plots16, before and after a natural log-transformation was applied, for each of these variables. 
1. R&D Expenditure 
Descriptives 
  
  Statistic Std. Error   
R&D Expenditure Skewness 1.788 .075 
  
Kurtosis 2.664 .149 
  
ln(R&D Expenditure) Skewness -.408 .075   
Kurtosis -.555 .149 
  
       
Tests of Normality 
  
Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
R&D expenditure .243 1069 .000 .720 1069 .000 
ln(R&D Expenditure) .061 1069 .000 .968 1069 .000 
                                                          
14 The absolute value for both skew and kurtosis should be as low as possible 
15 Both the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk test are insignificant when the distribution is not differing from a 
normal one. Hence, a lower statistic value is preferred. 
16 QQ-plots graph the observed value and the expected normal value for a variable. Consequently, the observed 
values should approximate the line of expected normal values. 
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2. Tobin’s Q 
Descriptives 
  
  Statistic Std. Error   
Tobin's Q Skewness 2.113 .076 
  
Kurtosis 6.554 .151   
ln(Tobin's Q) Skewness .819 .076   
Kurtosis .461 .151 
  
       
Tests of Normality 
  
Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
Tobin's Q_original .144 1048 .000 .812 1048 .000 
ln(Tobin's Q) .086 1048 .000 .953 1048 .000 











  Statistic 
Std. 
Error   
Revenue Skewness 1.831 .075 
  
Kurtosis 3.886 .150   
ln(Revenue) Skewness -.612 .075   
Kurtosis .004 .150 
  
       
Tests of Normality 
  
Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
Revenue_original .177 1068 .000 .803 1068 .000 
ln(Revenue) .069 1068 .000 .968 1068 .000 






II. Hierarchical multiple regression  
 
Variables Entered/Removeda 
Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method 
1 2016, CEO gender (0=female, 
1=male), ln(Tobin's Q), 
ln(Revenue), 2011, 2013, 2015, 
2012, 2014, 2010, 2009b 
. Enter 
2 Overconfidence (0=No,1=Yes), 
CEO tenure_originalb 
. Enter 
3 Moderatorb . Enter 
a. Dependent Variable: ln(R&D Expenditure) 
b. All requested variables entered. 
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .760a .578 .573 1.32864 
2 .764b .584 .579 1.31964 
3 .766c .587 .581 1.31630 
a. Predictors: (Constant), 2016, CEO gender (0=female, 1=male), ln(Tobin's Q), ln(Revenue), 2011, 2013, 2015, 
2012, 2014, 2010, 2009 
b. Predictors: (Constant), 2016, CEO gender (0=female, 1=male), ln(Tobin's Q), ln(Revenue), 2011, 2013, 2015, 
2012, 2014, 2010, 2009, Overconfidence (0=No,1=Yes), CEO tenure_original 
c. Predictors: (Constant), 2016, CEO gender (0=female, 1=male), ln(Tobin's Q), ln(Revenue), 2011, 2013, 2015, 
2012, 2014, 2010, 2009, Overconfidence (0=No,1=Yes), CEO tenure_original, Moderator 
 
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 2486.138 11 226.013 128.032 .000b 
Residual 1818.239 1030 1.765   
Total 4304.377 1041    
2 Regression 2514.158 13 193.397 111.054 .000c 
Residual 1790.219 1028 1.741   
Total 4304.377 1041    
3 Regression 2524.959 14 180.354 104.092 .000d 
Residual 1779.418 1027 1.733   
Total 4304.377 1041    
a. Dependent Variable: ln(R&D Expenditure) 
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b. Predictors: (Constant), 2016, CEO gender (0=female, 1=male), ln(Tobin's Q), ln(Revenue), 2011, 2013, 2015, 
2012, 2014, 2010, 2009 
c. Predictors: (Constant), 2016, CEO gender (0=female, 1=male), ln(Tobin's Q), ln(Revenue), 2011, 2013, 2015, 
2012, 2014, 2010, 2009, Overconfidence (0=No,1=Yes), CEO tenure_original 
d. Predictors: (Constant), 2016, CEO gender (0=female, 1=male), ln(Tobin's Q), ln(Revenue), 2011, 2013, 2015, 











B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) -6.888 .446  -15.441 .000   
ln(Revenue) 1.205 .033 .742 36.326 .000 .982 1.019 
ln(Tobin's Q) .786 .116 .142 6.763 .000 .934 1.071 
CEO gender 
(0=female, 1=male) 
.581 .261 .045 2.223 .026 .982 1.018 
2009 .179 .173 .028 1.034 .301 .550 1.818 
2010 .266 .172 .042 1.547 .122 .558 1.791 
2011 .192 .173 .030 1.112 .267 .570 1.755 
2012 .325 .173 .051 1.878 .061 .562 1.778 
2013 .152 .174 .023 .875 .382 .571 1.751 
2014 .215 .175 .033 1.230 .219 .583 1.714 
2015 .277 .175 .042 1.586 .113 .587 1.704 
2016 .270 .176 .040 1.532 .126 .592 1.690 
2 (Constant) -6.498 .456  -14.256 .000   
ln(Revenue) 1.179 .034 .727 35.161 .000 .947 1.056 
ln(Tobin's Q) .811 .116 .146 7.002 .000 .927 1.079 
CEO gender 
(0=female, 1=male) 
.653 .260 .051 2.508 .012 .977 1.024 
2009 .193 .172 .030 1.121 .262 .549 1.820 
2010 .281 .171 .044 1.646 .100 .557 1.795 
2011 .217 .172 .034 1.261 .208 .569 1.758 
2012 .358 .172 .056 2.081 .038 .561 1.783 
2013 .201 .173 .031 1.161 .246 .567 1.762 
2014 .279 .174 .042 1.602 .110 .578 1.730 
2015 .325 .174 .049 1.868 .062 .584 1.712 





-.093 .085 -.022 -1.089 .276 .986 1.014 
CEO tenure_original -.034 .009 -.080 -3.858 .000 .946 1.057 
3 (Constant) -6.633 .458  -14.488 .000   
ln(Revenue) 1.176 .033 .725 35.106 .000 .945 1.058 
ln(Tobin's Q) .808 .116 .146 6.989 .000 .927 1.079 
CEO gender 
(0=female, 1=male) 
.649 .260 .051 2.499 .013 .977 1.024 
2009 .199 .172 .031 1.157 .248 .549 1.820 
2010 .301 .171 .047 1.763 .078 .556 1.799 
2011 .242 .172 .038 1.409 .159 .567 1.764 
2012 .366 .172 .057 2.130 .033 .561 1.783 
2013 .212 .173 .033 1.228 .220 .567 1.763 
2014 .289 .174 .044 1.664 .097 .578 1.731 
2015 .350 .174 .053 2.011 .045 .582 1.717 
2016 .348 .175 .052 1.982 .048 .586 1.707 
Overconfidence 
(0=No,1=Yes) 
.168 .135 .040 1.244 .214 .394 2.535 
CEO tenure_original -.006 .014 -.015 -.451 .652 .366 2.732 
Moderator -.044 .018 -.104 -2.497 .013 .234 4.277 





III. Hierarchical multiple regression when dividing by ‘Industry Innovativeness’ 
1. Innovative Industries 
 
Variables Entered/Removeda,b 
Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method 
1 2016, ln(Revenue), ln(Tobin's Q), 
2011, 2013, CEO gender 
(0=female, 1=male), 2014, 2010, 
2015, 2012, 2009c 
. Enter 
2 Overconfidence (0=No,1=Yes), 
CEO tenure_originalc 
. Enter 
3 Moderatorc . Enter 
a. Dependent Variable: ln(R&D Expenditure) 
b. Models are based only on cases for which Innovative Industry =  1 





R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
Innovative Industry =  1 
(Selected) 
1 .812a .660 .653 1.16871 
2 .814b .663 .655 1.16545 
3 .815c .665 .656 1.16322 
a. Predictors: (Constant), 2016, ln(Revenue), ln(Tobin's Q), 2011, 2013, CEO gender (0=female, 1=male), 2014, 
2010, 2015, 2012, 2009 
b. Predictors: (Constant), 2016, ln(Revenue), ln(Tobin's Q), 2011, 2013, CEO gender (0=female, 1=male), 2014, 
2010, 2015, 2012, 2009, Overconfidence (0=No,1=Yes), CEO tenure_original 
c. Predictors: (Constant), 2016, ln(Revenue), ln(Tobin's Q), 2011, 2013, CEO gender (0=female, 1=male), 2014, 
2010, 2015, 2012, 2009, Overconfidence (0=No,1=Yes), CEO tenure_original, Moderator 
 
ANOVAa,b 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 1462.651 11 132.968 97.349 .000c 
Residual 753.970 552 1.366   
Total 2216.621 563    
2 Regression 1469.568 13 113.044 83.226 .000d 
Residual 747.053 550 1.358   
Total 2216.621 563    
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3 Regression 1473.784 14 105.270 77.801 .000e 
Residual 742.837 549 1.353   
Total 2216.621 563    
a. Dependent Variable: ln(R&D Expenditure) 
b. Selecting only cases for which Innovative Industry =  1 
c. Predictors: (Constant), 2016, ln(Revenue), ln(Tobin's Q), 2011, 2013, CEO gender (0=female, 1=male), 2014, 
2010, 2015, 2012, 2009 
d. Predictors: (Constant), 2016, ln(Revenue), ln(Tobin's Q), 2011, 2013, CEO gender (0=female, 1=male), 2014, 
2010, 2015, 2012, 2009, Overconfidence (0=No,1=Yes), CEO tenure_original 
e. Predictors: (Constant), 2016, ln(Revenue), ln(Tobin's Q), 2011, 2013, CEO gender (0=female, 1=male), 2014, 







t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -5.838 .506  -11.544 .000 
ln(Revenue) 1.150 .036 .807 31.995 .000 
ln(Tobin's Q) 1.027 .172 .158 5.967 .000 
CEO gender (0=female, 
1=male) 
.280 .276 .026 1.013 .311 
2009 .301 .211 .048 1.430 .153 
2010 .341 .209 .055 1.635 .103 
2011 .315 .207 .050 1.521 .129 
2012 .563 .209 .091 2.694 .007 
2013 .361 .211 .057 1.715 .087 
2014 .357 .211 .056 1.694 .091 
2015 .462 .210 .072 2.199 .028 
2016 .426 .211 .066 2.018 .044 
2 (Constant) -5.585 .517  -10.805 .000 
ln(Revenue) 1.138 .036 .799 31.369 .000 
ln(Tobin's Q) 1.064 .172 .164 6.169 .000 
CEO gender (0=female, 
1=male) 
.312 .277 .029 1.126 .261 
2009 .319 .210 .051 1.517 .130 
2010 .367 .208 .059 1.758 .079 
2011 .309 .207 .050 1.495 .135 
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2012 .587 .209 .095 2.808 .005 
2013 .378 .212 .060 1.789 .074 
2014 .367 .212 .057 1.734 .083 
2015 .483 .210 .075 2.300 .022 
2016 .423 .211 .065 2.002 .046 
Overconfidence 
(0=No,1=Yes) 
-.212 .103 -.052 -2.054 .040 
CEO tenure_original -.011 .012 -.024 -.941 .347 
3 (Constant) -5.665 .518  -10.938 .000 
ln(Revenue) 1.131 .036 .793 31.030 .000 
ln(Tobin's Q) 1.055 .172 .162 6.126 .000 
CEO gender (0=female, 
1=male) 
.293 .277 .027 1.059 .290 
2009 .317 .210 .051 1.511 .131 
2010 .379 .208 .061 1.822 .069 
2011 .329 .207 .053 1.591 .112 
2012 .604 .209 .097 2.892 .004 
2013 .384 .211 .061 1.817 .070 
2014 .360 .211 .056 1.705 .089 
2015 .523 .211 .081 2.479 .013 
2016 .438 .211 .068 2.076 .038 
Overconfidence 
(0=No,1=Yes) 
.030 .171 .007 .174 .862 
CEO tenure_original .018 .021 .038 .874 .383 
Moderator -.045 .025 -.097 -1.765 .078 
a. Dependent Variable: ln(R&D Expenditure) 





2. Non-innovative Industries 
Variables Entered/Removeda,b 
Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method 
1 2016, CEO gender (0=female, 
1=male), ln(Revenue), 2011, 
2014, ln(Tobin's Q), 2013, 2012, 
2015, 2010, 2009c 
. Enter 
2 Overconfidence (0=No,1=Yes), 
CEO tenure_originalc 
. Enter 
3 Moderatorc . Enter 
a. Dependent Variable: ln(R&D Expenditure) 
b. Models are based only on cases for which Innovative Industry =  0 





R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
Innovative Industry =  0 
(Selected) 
1 .788a .621 .613 1.27032 
2 .790b .624 .614 1.26802 
3 .793c .629 .618 1.26120 
a. Predictors: (Constant), 2016, CEO gender (0=female, 1=male), ln(Revenue), 2011, 2014, ln(Tobin's Q), 2013, 
2012, 2015, 2010, 2009 
b. Predictors: (Constant), 2016, CEO gender (0=female, 1=male), ln(Revenue), 2011, 2014, ln(Tobin's Q), 2013, 
2012, 2015, 2010, 2009, Overconfidence (0=No,1=Yes), CEO tenure_original 
c. Predictors: (Constant), 2016, CEO gender (0=female, 1=male), ln(Revenue), 2011, 2014, ln(Tobin's Q), 2013, 
2012, 2015, 2010, 2009, Overconfidence (0=No,1=Yes), CEO tenure_original, Moderator 
 
ANOVAa,b 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 1234.520 11 112.229 69.548 .000c 
Residual 751.986 466 1.614   
Total 1986.506 477    
2 Regression 1240.454 13 95.420 59.345 .000d 
Residual 746.052 464 1.608   
Total 1986.506 477    
3 Regression 1250.050 14 89.289 56.135 .000e 
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Residual 736.456 463 1.591   
Total 1986.506 477    
a. Dependent Variable: ln(R&D Expenditure) 
b. Selecting only cases for which Innovative Industry =  0 
c. Predictors: (Constant), 2016, CEO gender (0=female, 1=male), ln(Revenue), 2011, 2014, ln(Tobin's Q), 2013, 
2012, 2015, 2010, 2009 
d. Predictors: (Constant), 2016, CEO gender (0=female, 1=male), ln(Revenue), 2011, 2014, ln(Tobin's Q), 2013, 
2012, 2015, 2010, 2009, Overconfidence (0=No,1=Yes), CEO tenure_original 
e. Predictors: (Constant), 2016, CEO gender (0=female, 1=male), ln(Revenue), 2011, 2014, ln(Tobin's Q), 2013, 




Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -10.901 .749  -14.547 .000 
ln(Revenue) 1.385 .056 .721 24.851 .000 
ln(Tobin's Q) 1.174 .151 .232 7.757 .000 
CEO gender (0=female, 1=male) 2.330 .489 .137 4.770 .000 
2009 .188 .242 .030 .775 .439 
2010 .303 .240 .048 1.265 .206 
2011 .062 .244 .010 .255 .799 
2012 .083 .244 .013 .340 .734 
2013 -.064 .243 -.010 -.264 .792 
2014 -.009 .245 -.001 -.037 .971 
2015 -.073 .247 -.011 -.296 .767 
2016 -.070 .250 -.010 -.282 .778 
2 (Constant) -10.516 .782  -13.452 .000 
ln(Revenue) 1.352 .058 .704 23.279 .000 
ln(Tobin's Q) 1.178 .151 .233 7.792 .000 
CEO gender (0=female, 1=male) 2.347 .488 .138 4.812 .000 
2009 .195 .242 .031 .808 .420 
2010 .300 .239 .048 1.255 .210 
2011 .074 .244 .011 .303 .762 
2012 .093 .244 .014 .380 .704 
2013 -.040 .243 -.006 -.166 .869 
2014 .027 .246 .004 .109 .914 
2015 -.041 .247 -.006 -.165 .869 
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2016 -.026 .251 -.004 -.105 .917 
Overconfidence (0=No,1=Yes) .044 .122 .010 .363 .717 
CEO tenure_original -.021 .011 -.057 -1.893 .059 
3 (Constant) -10.767 .784  -13.729 .000 
ln(Revenue) 1.353 .058 .705 23.418 .000 
ln(Tobin's Q) 1.172 .150 .232 7.791 .000 
CEO gender (0=female, 1=male) 2.372 .485 .140 4.887 .000 
2009 .210 .240 .033 .875 .382 
2010 .331 .238 .053 1.387 .166 
2011 .103 .243 .016 .424 .672 
2012 .082 .242 .013 .339 .735 
2013 -.025 .242 -.004 -.104 .917 
2014 .053 .245 .008 .215 .830 
2015 -.038 .246 -.006 -.155 .877 
2016 .012 .250 .002 .049 .961 
Overconfidence (0=No,1=Yes) .393 .187 .092 2.105 .036 
CEO tenure_original .011 .017 .029 .634 .526 
Moderator -.054 .022 -.139 -2.456 .014 
a. Dependent Variable: ln(R&D Expenditure) 
b. Selecting only cases for which Innovative Industry =  0 
 
 
 
